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Abstract
The performance of alternative ﬁs c a lr u l e si se x a m i n e di na ne n -
dogenous growth model with public capital and debt. In addition
to investing in infrastructure, the government spends on maintenance
and health. Infrastructure aﬀects the production of both commodi-
ties and health services. The performance of a balanced budget rule,
as well as standard and modiﬁed (including and excluding productive
spending) golden rules and primary surplus rules are compared nu-
merically. Under a range of plausible parameter conﬁgurations and
spending shares, and as long as the debt-related risk premium is not
too elastic, a primary surplus rule that excludes productive spend-
ing is shown to perform better than alternative rules in response to a
variety of shocks. As a practical policy implication, we propose the
deﬁnition of a transparent Core Productive Expenditure Program.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: O41, H54, I28.
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3The policy of rendering the investment budget elastic while stabi-
lizing the current budget–which follows from the acceptance of bor-
rowing in the one and rejection of borrowing in the other case–may
easily result in an undesirable curtailment of useful “ordinary” expen-
ditures.
Richard A. Musgrave (1939, p. 263).
1 Introduction
There has been much debate in recent years on whether explicit ﬁscal frame-
works may help to achieve and maintain ﬁscal discipline. Fiscal rules, in
particular, have taken the form of maintaining ﬁxed targets for the deﬁcit
(variously deﬁned) and/or public debt ratios to GDP. Such rules have been
used in industrial and developing countries alike. In the euro area, the com-
mitment was made under the Stability and Growth Pact to limit the deﬁcit to
3 percent of GDP. Brazil introduced a Fiscal Responsibility Law in May 2000
that prohibits ﬁnancial support operations among diﬀerent levels of govern-
ment and requires that limits on the indebtedness of each level of government
be set by the Senate.
A common criticism of standard deﬁcit rules (including balanced budget
rules) is that they are inﬂexible (to the extent that they are deﬁned irre-
spective of the cyclical position of the economy) and tend to be pro-cyclical.
Studies based on ﬁscal constraints in US states, such as Fatás and Mihov
(2006), have shown indeed that while balanced budget rules have proved ef-
fective in limiting the size of deﬁcits and the volatility of spending, they have
also imposed costs to the states’ economies because of the large (downward)
adjustment in government spending that is required during recessions.1 Sim-
ilar results have been shown to hold in cross-country studies of industrial
countries (see Lane (2003)).
In response, deﬁcit rules have been reﬁned and are now often applied ei-
ther to a cyclically adjusted deﬁcit measure (such as the structural budget
deﬁcit) or an average over the economic cycle. Chile, for instance, introduced
1The evidence provided by Canova and Pappa (2005), which is also based on the
experience of US states, does not support the existence of a close link between ﬁscal
constraints and (lack of) volatility–the reason being, in their view, that these constraints
have not been properly enforced.
4in early 2000 a structural surplus rule (of 1 percent of GDP) that allows for
limited deﬁcits during recessions.2 By doing so, advocates claim, these rules
may allow the operation of automatic stabilizers and possibly provide some
room for discretionary policy within the cycle. However, this increased ﬂex-
ibility comes at a cost, because the benchmark against which ﬁscal perfor-
m a n c ei st ob ej u d g e di sm a d em o r ec o m p l i c a t e d – e s p e c i a l l yi fe s t i m a t e so f
potential output are revised, as is often the case. In turn, this increases the
scope to bypass the rules, making them potentially harder to enforce and un-
dermining their credibility. In countries with a poor (or uneven) track record
of policy consistency, lack of credibility may lead to higher interest rates (as
in Agénor, Jensen, Yeldan, and Verghis (2006)), thereby exacerbating debt
sustainability problems.
Another criticism of deﬁcit rules is that they discourage public invest-
ment. Some economists have advocated a “golden rule” approach to bud-
getary policy, whereby the focus is on maintaining a balance or surplus on the
current ﬁscal account (that is, current revenues less current expenditures),
with net capital expenditure ﬁnanced from government savings and borrow-
ing. However, this rule has also been criticized on a number of grounds; critics
have pointed out, among other arguments, its vulnerability to creative ac-
counting, and the fact that a preferential treatment of physical investment
could bias expenditure decisions against spending on other potentially pro-
ductive components (such as education and health), and stress that what
matters to the economy, and the growth process in particular, is the overall
capital stock–regardless of whether it is private or public (see, for instance
Buti, Eijﬃnger, and Franco (2003)).
Moreover, components of recurrent expenditure (such as maintenance
spending on infrastructure, schools, and hospitals) may be equally important
to maintain the quality of the services produced by public and private capital.
In a growth context, therefore, the question that arises is where should one
d r a wt h el i n ei ni m p o s i n gad e ﬁcit rule. This is the question that we address
in this paper, in the context of an endogenous growth model with public
capital and debt. In addition to investing in infrastructure, the government
spends on maintenance (which improves the durability of public capital) and
health services (which raise labor productivity). Infrastructure, in turn, af-
fects the production of both commodities and health services. We examine
2The budget is adjusted not only for the eﬀects of the business cycle on public ﬁnances,
but also for ﬂuctuations in the price of copper–Chile’s main export commodity.
5the performance (measured in terms of their impact on growth and ﬁscal in-
dicators) of several alternative ﬁscal rules: a balanced budget rule, a golden
rule, and four alternative primary surplus rules. Because of the complexity of
the model, these rules are compared numerically, based on a calibration that
reﬂects some key characteristics of middle-income countries–where, presum-
ably, the productivity eﬀects of public capital are potentially the largest. In
addition, there is growing evidence suggesting that in these countries, exter-
nalities associated with public infrastructure may be more important that
commonly thought. Indeed, it has been found that infrastructure may have
a sizable impact on health and education outcomes.3 For instance, access to
clean water and sanitation helps to improve health and thereby productiv-
ity. By reducing the cost of boiling water, and reducing the need to rely on
smoky traditional fuels for cooking, access to electricity also helps to improve
hygiene and health. Availability of electricity is essential for the function-
ing of hospitals and the delivery of health services. Better transportation
networks also contribute to easier access to health care, particularly in rural
areas. There is also evidence of direct linkages between infrastructure and
education. Electricity allows for more studying and greater access to learning
technologies. Enrollment rates and the quality of education tend to improve
with better transportation networks, particularly in rural areas. Greater ac-
cess to sanitation and clean water in schools also tend to raise attendance
rates. Although we do not attempt to model explicitly the impact of in-
frastructure on education, and its implications for the design of ﬁscal rules,
our focus on health is suﬃcient to illustrate the potential implications of
adding a learning technology.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
in more detail the rationale and limitations of the golden rule. Section III
presents the model. Section IV examine st h en a t u r eo ft h ee q u i l i b r i u mg r o w t h
path with a balanced budget, which we view as our “benchmark” case. The
properties of the model under that rule are fully characterized. Section V
speciﬁes four alternative ﬁscal rules: standard primary surplus and golden
rules, and two alternative rules that exclude all productive spending (includ-
ing not only infrastructure investment but also spending on maintenance
and health). Because the resulting dynamic system cannot be solved analyt-
ically, we resort to numerical simulations for comparative analysis. Section
3See Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) and Agénor and Neanidis (2006a) for a more
detailed discussion.
6VI presents the calibration procedure. Experiments are reported in Section
VII, where we consider both the stability properties of the model and the
speed of convergence (in response to various shocks) to the steady state.
We examine, in particular, whether there exist some plausible parameter
conﬁgurations (pertaining, most notably, to the degree of eﬃciency of pub-
lic investment in infrastructure) under which a primary surplus rule that
excludes both maintenance and health spending yields higher steady-state
growth and more rapid convergence than alternative rules. The ﬁnal section
oﬀe r ss o m ec o n c l u d i n gr e m a r k s .
2 The Debate on the Golden Rule
As noted earlier, a common criticism of budget rules that take the form of
strict limits on the overall ﬁscal deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio is that they may end
up discouraging public investment. A ﬁscal rule that caps the overall budget
deﬁcit puts both current and investment spending on an equal footing in the
measurement of the deﬁcit. The danger, then, is that whenever the rule be-
comes binding, the government will choose to cut those spending categories
that are politically less costly to alter. If the political cost of postponing or
abandoning investment projects is lower than the political cost of constrain-
ing current expenditure–as is often the case in practice–an overall deﬁcit
rule will entail a built-in bias against public investment. In the presence of a
close complementarity eﬀect between public capital and private investment
(as one would expect for infrastructure), there could be a signiﬁcant adverse
eﬀect on growth.
The existence of this bias has led a number of economists, most notably
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), to advocate reliance on a “golden rule”,
whereby the focus is on maintaining a current balance (that is, current rev-
enues less current expenditures) or surplus, with capital expenditures being
ﬁnanced from government savings and borrowing. Under the Blanchard-
Giavazzi rule, governments should borrow in net terms on a continuous basis
only to the extent that this net borrowing ﬁnances net public investment,
that is, gross investment less capital depreciation (which counts as current
spending).4 This rule therefore would allow gross borrowing for the purpose
4Musgrave (1939) was an early proponent of a rule aimed at excluding capital outlays
from the operating budget, while including depreciation of the government capital stock.
However, as indicated in the quote at the beginning of this paper, he was also aware of
7of reﬁnancing maturing debt, thereby leaving net debt unaﬀected. Moreover,
to the extent that public investment boosts the economy’s production capac-
ity on a permanent rather than just temporary basis, it would aﬀect welfare
of not only the present generation but also future generations. Thus, inter-
generational equity provides a rationale–as pointed out by Musgrave (1939,
pp. 269-70) early on–to spread the costs of public investment over both
current and future generations, by ﬁnancing investment through government
borrowing instead of current tax revenues. By implementing a golden rule–
or, more speciﬁcally, by allowing no new borrowing in net terms to ﬁnance
current spending–the outstanding debt stock of any country would, over
time, become fully backed by the public capital stock.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the golden rule has attracted much criti-
cism. First, advocates of the golden rule have generally emphasized the need
to exclude capital expenditure on infrastructure from the ﬁscal deﬁcit rule.
In countries with large infrastructure gaps, certain projects (such as roads,
ports, or airports) may indeed have rates of return that are so high, and
a degree of complementarity with private investment that is so tight, that
they justify receiving priority in the design of a public investment program.
However, in other countries (particularly those with low income), investment
in health and human capital may be an equally important priority, in part
because it may have a larger impact on growth. Excluding public investment
in “core” infrastructure only (as opposed to investment in schools and hospi-
tals) from ﬁscal targets would create a bias against these other components
of public investment.
Second, if applied to gross public investment–as opposed to net invest-
ment, as advocated by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004)–the golden rule could
turn into an obstacle to deﬁcit and debt reduction. Given the ratio of public
investment as a share of GDP, the long-run equilibrium level of government
debt could be quite high, especially in an environment of low inﬂation. This,
in turn, could push interest rates and debt service to unsustainable levels.
To prevent this from happening, some countries have also considered a limit
on public debt. The United Kingdom, for instance, adopted the golden rule
of borrowing only to ﬁnance capital spending, and accompanied it by the
sustainable investment rule, which limits net debt to 40 percent of GDP over
the cycle.
Third, the golden rule is not a good guide to ﬁscal policy if some com-
the potential “displacement eﬀects” that such a rule could lead to.
8ponents of current expenditure–such as on operation and maintenance that
keeps existing infrastructure in good condition, or spending that contributes
to health outcomes and the accumulation of human capital–can promote
growth more eﬀectively than capital expenditure per se. This may be par-
ticularly so if the golden rule creates a moral hazard problem, in the sense
that the possibility of borrowing without limits to ﬁnance investments low-
ers the care that must be taken when evaluating the costs and beneﬁts of
each project. Put diﬀerently, components of recurrent expenditure such as
spending on schools, and hospitals may be equally important to maintain the
quality of the services produced by the capital stock in those categories.
Fourth, rules focusing on current spending may entail a bias against op-
erations and maintenance, the current public spending required to keep the
existing physical infrastructure in good working order. A depressingly rou-
tine fact in developing countries is that new projects are undertaken while the
existing infrastructure is left to deteriorate.5 The deterioration of infrastruc-
t u r em a yr e t a r dg r o w t hm o r et h a nn e wc a pital projects add to growth, if for
instance maintaining public capital raises the durability of private capital, as
discussed for instance by Agénor (2005b) and Agénor and Moreno-Dodson
(2006).
A broad implication of the foregoing discussion is that alternative rules
may have an ambiguous eﬀect on growth and ﬁscal performance. The ques-
tion that arises, therefore, is where should one draw the line in imposing
ad e ﬁcit rule. As noted earlier, current spending on education and health
enhances human capital. Excluding them from, say, a primary surplus rule is
all the more important in countries where vast amounts of ﬂow spending in
infrastructure are wasted and turn only partly into public capital, and if pub-
lic capital in infrastructure has a small complementarity eﬀect with private
investment. In such conditions, singling out public investment from other
budget items makes little sense; a tax reform that alleviates distortions and
translates into a lowers tax burden on ﬁrms may lead to higher private in-
5The quality of existing infrastructure will tend to deteriorate if corruption leads to cut-
backs on operation and maintenance expenditure. Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) have claimed
to ﬁnd evidence that countries with high corruption tend to have poor quality infrastruc-
ture. Because direct cross-country data on operation and maintenance expenditures are
not available, their analysis uses as a proxy a measure of “expenditures on other goods and
services,” taken from the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics, which include operation
and maintenance expenditures. However, this is a very unreliable measure. Note also that
both quantity and quality of the public capital stock may be aﬀected by corruption.
9vestment (and higher growth) and may be preferable to an increase in public
investment. At the same time, however, public capital in infrastructure may
have (as noted in the introduction) a sizable impact on health and education
outcomes. If these eﬀects are suﬃciently strong, a rule that entails some
bias toward investment in infrastructure only may still lead to higher growth
r a t e s – d e s p i t es o m ed e g r e eo fi n e ﬃciency in the investment process itself.
Our analytical framework, and subsequent numerical simulations, attempt
to shed some light on the importance of these various eﬀects.
3T h e F r a m e w o r k
The economy that we consider is closed and populated by an inﬁnitely-lived
representative household-producer (or household, for short). A single traded
commodity, which can be used for consumption or investment, is produced
with labor and capital. The price of the good is constant and normalized
to unity. The government has no access to seigniorage but can issue bonds
to ﬁnance its deﬁcit. It collects a proportional tax on output, invests in in-
frastructure, and spends on maintenance and health services. It also services
its debt and provides lump-sum transfers to households. Infrastructure and
health services (which are produced by the government) are provided free of
charge.
3.1 Production
Commodities are produced, in quantity Y , with private capital, KP, public
capital in infrastructure, KI,a n de ﬀective labor, deﬁned as the product of
the quantity of labor and productivity, A. Population growth is zero. Nor-
malizing the population size to unity and assuming that the technology is
Cobb-Douglas yields6
Y = K
α
I A
βK
1−α−β
P , (1)
where α,β ∈ (0,1).
Productivity depends solely on the availability of health services, H.7 For
simplicity, we assume that the relationship between A and H is one of strict
6In what folllows, time subscripts are omitted for simplicity, and a dot over a variable
is used to denote its time derivative.
7See Agénor and Neanidis (2006b) for a more general speciﬁcation of productivity.
10proportionality, so that A = H. Using this result with (1) yields
Y =(
KI
KP
)
α(
H
KP
)
βKP. (2)
From standard conditions for proﬁt maximization, the gross (pre-tax)
wage rate, ω, and the direct pre-tax rental rate on capital, rK,a r eg i v e nb y
ω = βY/H, rK = ηY/KP, (3)
where η ≡ 1 − α − β.
As noted earlier, access to public infrastructure is provided at no cost to
users. As in Agénor and Neanidis (2006b), we will assume in what follows
that the implicit rent corresponding to the marginal return on public capital,
αY/KI, accrues to private capital. The eﬀective rate of return on private
physical capital, r, exceeds therefore the direct marginal product given in
equation (3). Indeed, from the identity Y = ωH + rKP,a sw e l la st h e
condition on ω, r is given by
r =
(1 − β)Y
KP
>r K. (4)
Production of health services requires combining government spending
on health, GH, and public capital in infrastructure. Assuming also a Cobb-
Douglas technology yields
H = K
μ
I G
1−μ
H , (5)
where μ ∈ (0,1).
3.2 Household Optimization
The household’s optimization problem can be speciﬁed as
max
C
V =
Z ∞
0
C1−1/σ
1 − 1/σ
exp(−ρt)dt, σ 6=1 , (6)
where C is consumption, ρ t h ed i s c o u n tr a t e ,a n dσ is the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution.
The household’s resource constraint is given by
˙ W = ˙ KP + ˙ B =( 1− τ)(ωH + rW)+T − C, (7)
11where W = KP + B is total assets, consisting of private physical capital
and government bonds, in quantity B, T is lump-sum transfers (taken as
given by the household), τ ∈ (0,1) is the tax rate on income. Taxes are
levied on interest-inclusive income, with interest income consisting not only
of the (eﬀective) return to capital but also of the return to government bonds.
Through standard (after-tax) arbitrage conditions, the rateo fr e t u r no nb o t h
categories of assets is identical and equal to r. For simplicity, we assume that
private capital does not depreciate.8
The household takes public policies and the depreciation rate as given
when choosing the optimal sequence of consumption. Using (1), (6), and (7),
the current-value Hamiltonian for problem (6) can be written as
L =
C1−1/σ
1 − 1/σ
+ λ[(1 − τ)(ωH + rW)+T − C],
where λ is the co-state variable associated with constraint (7). From the ﬁrst-
order condition dH/dC =0and the co-state condition −dH/dW = ˙ λ − ρλ,
optimality conditions for this problem take the familiar form
C
−1/σ = λ, (8)
˙ λ = λ[ρ − (1 − τ)r], (9)
together with the budget constraint (7) and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞λW exp(−ρt)=0 . (10)
3.3 Government
The government invests in infrastructure capital, GI, and spends on mainte-
nance, GM, health services, GH, unproductive items, GU, transfers, T,a n d
interest payments, rB. As noted earlier, it also collects a proportional tax τ
on output. Thus, the government budget constraint is given by
˙ B =
X
h=I,H,M,U
Gh + T + rB − τ(ωH + rW). (11)
8With private capital depreciating at the rate δP, the interest arbitrage condition would
take the form rB = r − δP/(1 − τ),w h e r erB i st h er a t eo fr e t u r no ng o v e r n m e n tb o n d s .
12We begin ﬁrst with the assumption that all components of spending are
ﬁxed fractions of total tax revenues:
Gh = υhτ(ωH + rW),h = I,H,M,T,U (12)
Using these equations, the government budget constraint, equation (11),
can be rewritten as
˙ B = rB − (1 −
X
h=I,H,M,T,U
υh)τ(ωH + rW). (13)
Using (12), the stock of public capital in infrastructure evolves over time
according to
˙ KI = ϕυIτ(ωH + rW) − δIKI, (14)
where δI ∈ (0,1) is a constant depreciation rate and ϕ ∈ (0,1) an eﬃciency
parameter that measures the extent to which investment ﬂows translate into
actual accumulation of public capital. The case ϕ<1 reﬂects the view that
investment outlays are subject to ineﬃciencies, which tend to limit their
positive impact on the public capital stock.9
As in Agénor (2005b), the rate of depreciation of public capital in in-
frastructure, δI, is taken to depend negatively on the ratio of maintenance
expenditure to the public stock of capital in infrastructure:
δI =1− ε(
GM
KI
)
ζ, (15)
where ε ∈ (0,1) and ζ>0.10 Thus, maintenance expenditure enhances the
durability of public infrastructure capital.
The government cannot run a Ponzi scheme, which implies that it is
subject to the transversality condition
lim
t→∞Bt exp[−
Z t
0
rudu]=0 ,
9Arestoﬀ and Hurlin (2005), for instance, estimate the value of ϕ to vary between 0.4
and 0.6 for a group of developing countries. As argued by Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) poor
eﬃciency of public investment may be the consequence of a high degree of corruption.
10These restrictions on ε and ζ are suﬃcient to ensure that δI ∈ (0,1) as long as
GM/KI ≤ 1.
13or, using (11),
B0 +
Z ∞
0
(G + T)exp[
Z t
0
rudu]dt =
Z ∞
0
Z exp[
Z t
0
rudu]dt.
where G =
X
h=I,H,M,U
Gh and Z = τ(ωH + rW).11 Equivalently, using (7)
yields
B0 =( 1− Συh)τ
Z ∞
0
(ωH + rW)exp[
Z t
0
rudu]dt. (16)
From (7), (11), and the identity Y = ωH + rKP, the economy’s con-
solidated budget constraint (or equivalently, the goods market equilibrium
condition) can be derived as
Y = C + ˙ KP + G. (17)
It should be noted that although we focus solely on the eﬃciency of
infrastructure investment in this paper, there are equally important issues
associated with the degree of eﬃciency of current spending on health and
maintenance. Accounting for partial eﬃciency could be introduced by re-
placing GH by ϕHGH in (5), and GM by ϕMGM in (15), with ϕH,ϕ M ∈ (0,1)
representing eﬃciency parameters. Sensitivity tests similar to those reported
later with respect to changes in ϕ c o u l dt h e r e f o r eb ep e r f o r m e dw i t hr e s p e c t
to changes in ϕH and ϕM as well.
4 Benchmark Case: Balanced Budget Rule
As a benchmark case, let us consider the case of a zero deﬁcit (or balanced
budget) rule. We denote this rule BBR, and we implement it by imposing
˙ B =0in (11) and solving the government budget constraint for lump-sum
transfers, T. Equivalently, setting the constant value of B equal to zero as
well, the model determines endogenously the share of spending on transfers,
υT:
υT =1−
X
h=I,H,M,U
υh. (18)
11Note that economies that have unsustainable policies in the medium run may have a
sustainable public debt for t →∞ .
14This rule ensures that the transversality condition (16) is satisﬁed, given
that it entails B0 =0 . It is a particular case of the rule ˙ B = γBB,w h e r e
γB ∈ (0,1) is a constant growth rate.
Determining the balanced growth path (BGP) associated with BBR pro-
ceeds in three steps. First, note that from (4), (12), (14), and (15), noting
that ωH +rW = ωH +rKP = Y ,a n dt h a tGM/KI = υMτY/KI with ζ =1
for simplicity,12
˙ KI
KI
= ϕυIτ(
Y
KI
) − δI = τ(ϕυI + ευM)(
Y
KP
)k
−1
I − 1, (19)
where kI = KI/KP. From (1), (5), and (12),
Y = k
α
I (
K
μ
I G
1−μ
H
KP
)
βKP = k
α+μβ
I (υHτ)
(1−μ)β(
Y
KP
)
(1−μ)βKP.
This expression can be rewritten as
Y
KP
=( υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I , (20)
where Ω ≡ 1 − (1 − μ)β>0.
Combining this result with (19) and (15) yields
˙ KI
KI
= τ
1/Ω(ϕυI + ευM)υH
(1−μ)β/Ωk
−η/Ω
I − 1. (21)
Second, from the budget constraint (7) with ˙ B = B0 =0 ,t o g e t h e rw i t h
(12) and (18),
˙ KP = qY − C,
where q ≡ 1 − τ
P
h=I,H,M,U υh,s ot h a tq ∈ (0,1). Substituting (1) and (20)
in this expression yields
˙ KP
KP
= q(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I − c, (22)
where c = C/KP.
12Although in the calibration we take ζ diﬀerent than unity to get reasonable estimates
of depreciation of public infrastructure in the simulations, this simpliﬁcation does not alter
the saddlepath properties as long as ζ>0.
15Third, taking logs of (8) and diﬀerentiating with respect to time yields
˙ C/C = −σ(˙ λ/λ). Substituting (9) in this expression yields, setting s ≡
(1 − τ)(1 − β),
˙ C
C
= σ[s(
Y
KP
) − ρ], (23)
that is, using (20),
˙ C
C
= σs(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I − σρ. (24)
Equations (21), (22), and (24) can be further condensed into a ﬁrst-order
nonlinear diﬀerential equation system in c = C/KP and kI = KI/KP:
˙ c
c
=( σs− q)(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I + c − σρ, (25)
˙ kI
kI
= τ
1/ΩχυH
(1−μ)β/Ωk
−η/Ω
I − q(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I + c − 1, (26)
where χ ≡ ϕυI + ευM.
These two equations, together with the initial condition k0
I > 0 and the
transversality condition (10), characterize the dynamics of the economy.
The BGP is a set of functions {c,kI}∞
t=0 such that equations (25) and (26),
the budget constraint (18), and the household’s transversality condition (10),
are satisﬁed, and consumption and the stocks of public and private capital,
all grow at the same constant rate γ.13 Along the BGP, the household’s
transversality condition is always satisﬁed because C/KP is constant.
As shown in the Appendix, the economy is saddlepath stable in the neigh-
borhood of the BGP. Moreover, the BGP is unique. Thus, the model is locally
determinate.14 From (21) and (24), the steady-state growth rate is given by
γ = σs(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ω˜ k
(α+μβ)/Ω
I − σρ, (27)
γ = τ
1/Ω(ϕυI + ευM)υH
(1−μ)β/Ω˜ k
−η/Ω
I − 1, (28)
where ˜ x denotes the stationary value of x.15
13γ is also the rate of growth of output of commodities and health services, given the
assumption of constant returns to scale.
14To ensure that δI > 0 in the steady state requires 1−ευMτ1/ΩυH
(1−μ)β/Ω˜ k
−η/Ω
I > 0.
This imposes, in principle, a restriction on the admissible values of the shares υM and υH,
or ε.
15A diagrammatic analysis of the adjustment path, as well as experiments associated
165 Alternative Fiscal Rules
We now consider several alternative ﬁscal rules and their implications for
growth dynamics. We begin with the golden rule, given the attention that
it has received in the recent literature. Next, we consider two alternative
primary surplus rules, a standard rule that includes all components of current
spending, and an alternative rule, which excludes all productive spending
categories. Finally, we consider a modiﬁed golden rule, whereby borrowing
is used to ﬁnance not only infrastructure investment but also productive
components of current spending.
5.1 The Golden Rule
As discussed earlier, funding capital expenditure from current revenues would
imply a disincentive to undertake projects producing deferred economic bene-
ﬁts but entailing upfront political costs; this disincentive may be particularly
high during periods of ﬁscal consolidation. Moreover, the golden rule allows
spreading the burden of capital projects over the diﬀerent generations of tax-
payers beneﬁting from them. But to do so, as emphasized by Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2004), the rule needs to be deﬁn e di nt e r m so fn e ts p e n d i n g . I n -
deed, it is only the net addition to public capital (or net capital spending)
that should be ﬁnanced via borrowing while the part that covers depreciation
(or maintenance) should remain tax ﬁnanced.
Formally, the golden rule (denoted GR) can be implemented in our frame-
work by requiring that the sum of (current) government spending on health,
maintenance, transfers, and interest payments, must be equal to a fraction,
θ,o ft a xr e v e n u e s :
GU + GH + GM + T + rB = θτ(ωH + rW), (29)
where θ ∈ (0,1). We will also assume that all spending shares, other than
transfers, continue to be ﬁxed fractions of total revenues, as indicated in (12).
Thus, equation (29) determines residually lump-sum transfers as
T = τ(θ − υH − υM − υU)(ωH + rW) − rB. (30)
with changes in the spending shares υH, υI,a n dυM, can be performed as in Agénor
(2005a, 2005b, 2005c).
17Combining (11) and (29) implies also that debt accumulates as a result
of excess investment in infrastructure over the remaining tax revenues:
˙ B = GI − (1 − θ)τ(ωH + rW). (31)
Using (12), equation (31) becomes
˙ B = −(1 − υI − θ)τ[ωH + r(B + KP)]. (32)
Dividing (32) by B yields
˙ B
B
= −(1 − υI − θ)τb
−1[ωh+ r(1 + b)], (33)
where h = H/KP and b = B/KP. From (5) and (12),
h = k
μ
I(
GH
KP
)
1−μ =( υHτ)
1−μk
μ
I[ωh+ r(1 + b)]
1−μ,
whereas equations (3) imply
ω = βk
α
I h
β−1,r =( 1− β)k
α
I h
β. (34)
Substituting these expressions in the preceding equation yields
h =( υHτ)
(1−μ)/Ωg
(1−μ)/Ωk
Φ/Ω
I , (35)
where Φ ≡ μ + α(1 − μ) > 0 and g =1+( 1− β)b.
Equations (34) can also be used in (33) to give
˙ B
B
= −(1 − υI − θ)b
−1τgk
α
I h
β, (36)
which implies that debt increases over time only if υI + θ>1.
The household budget constraint (7) can be rewritten as
˙ KP
KP
= −
˙ B
B
b +( 1− τ)[ωh+ r(1 + b)] + z − c,
where z = T/KP. Substituting (36) in this expression and using (34) yields
˙ KP
KP
=[ ( 1− υI − θ)τ +( 1− τ)]gk
α
I h
β + z − c. (37)
18From (14) and (15), and given that GM/KI = υMτ(ωH + rW)/KI,t h e
growth rate of public capital in infrastructure is given by
˙ KI
KI
= k
−1
I (ϕυI + ευM)τ[ωh+ r(1 + b)] − 1,
that is, using (34),
˙ KI
KI
= k
−1
I (ϕυI + ευM)τgk
α
I h
β − 1. (38)
Finally, dividing (30) by KP yields
z =( θ − υH − υM − υU)τ[ωh+ r(1 + b)] − rb,
that is, using (34),
z =[ ( θ − υH − υM − υU)τg− (1 − β)b]k
α
I h
β. (39)
Equations (23), (35), (36), (37), (38), and (39) describe the economy’s
dynamics. These equations can be further manipulated to produce a ﬁrst-
order diﬀerential equation system in c, kI,a n db:
˙ c
c
= {Πτg+ σs− 1}(υHτg)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I − σρ+ c, (40)
˙ kI
kI
=
©£
Π + k
−1
I (ϕυI + ευM)
¤
τg− 1
ª
(υHτg)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I +c−1, (41)
˙ b
b
=
©£
Π + b
−1(υI + θ − 1)
¤
τg− 1
ª
(υHτg)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I + c, (42)
where Π ≡
P
h=I,H,M,U υh < 1.
The steady-state growth rate is given again by (27), or alternatively, from
(36) and (38), under the assumption that υI + θ>1,
γ =( υI + θ − 1)˜ b
−1τ˜ g˜ k
α
I ˜ h
β, (43)
γ =( ϕυI + ευM)τ˜ g˜ k
α−1
I ˜ h
β − 1, (44)
with ˜ g =1+( 1− β)˜ b.16
16In the simulation results reported below, we set θ =1 , which implies indeed that
υI +θ>1. Note also that equation (37) provides a fourth alternative form of γ; but given
the steady-state solution for c obtained by setting ˙ c =0in (37), it is in fact equivalent to
(43).
195.2 Primary Surplus Rules
A ﬁxed primary surplus rule can be speciﬁed in the present framework in
several alternative ways. We ﬁrst consider the “standard” case where all
components of current spending (including transfers) are included. We then
consider an alternative case, excluding all productive spending categories,
namely infrastructure, maintenance, and health.
5.2.1 General Form
Under a general primary surplus rule (denoted PSR), the constraint linking
current expenditure and tax revenues is given by
GU + GH + GM + GI + T = θτ(ωH + rW), (45)
which indicates that all noninterest spending (including transfers), must be
ﬁnanced by a fraction θ of total tax revenues.
Combining (11) and (45) yields
˙ B = rB − (1 − θ)τ(ωH + rW), (46)
which implies that interest payments, to the extent that they are not covered
by a residual fraction 1 − θ of tax revenues, must be ﬁnanced by borrowing.
Using (12) and dividing by B,w eg e t
˙ B
B
= −(1 − θ)τb
−1[ωh+ r(1 + b)] + r,
which, using (34), and the deﬁnition of g,c a nb ew r i t t e na s
˙ B
B
=
£
−(1 − θ)b
−1τg+( 1− β)
¤
k
α
I h
β. (47)
As in the previous section, dividing the household budget constraint (7)
by KP gives
˙ KP
KP
= −
˙ B
B
b +( 1− τ)[ωh+ r(1 + b)] + z − c,
where z = T/KP. Using (12) and (45) implies
T =( θ − υH − υM − υU − υI)τ[ωh+ r(1 + b)]. (48)
20Dividing (48) by KP, together with (34), yields
z =( θ − υH − υM − υU − υI)τgk
α
I h
β. (49)
Substituting (47) and (49) in the above equation and using (34), the
growth rate of private capital becomes
˙ KP
KP
=( 1− Πτg)k
α
I h
β − c. (50)
The growth rates of consumption, ˙ C/C, and public capital in infrastruc-
ture, ˙ KI/KI, a r ea sd e ﬁned in (38) and (35), respectively. Equation (23)
deﬁnes h as a function of b and kI. Together with (47) and (50), these equa-
tions can be rearranged to deﬁne the dynamics of the economy under the
general primary surplus rule. T h ed y n a m i ce q u a t i o n sd r i v i n gc, kI are given,
as before, by (40) and (41), whereas the equation of motion for b is now given
by
˙ b
b
=
©£
Π +( θ − 1)b
−1¤
τg− β
ª
(υHτg)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I + c. (51)
The steady-state growth rate is given in equivalent forms by (27), (44),
or, from (47),17
γ =
£
−(1 − θ)b
−1τ˜ g +( 1− β)
¤˜ k
α
I ˜ h
β. (52)
5.2.2 A Modiﬁed Rule
We now deﬁne a ﬁxed primary surplus rule (denoted MPSR) that excludes
all productive spending, that is infrastructure, maintenance and health. The
constraint linking current expenditure and tax revenues therefore takes the
form
GU + T = θτ(ωH + rW). (53)
Combining this equation with (11) yields
˙ B = GI + GH + GM + rB − (1 − θ)τ(ωH + rW). (54)
17In the simulation results reported later, we set θ =1 ; this assumption ensures that
γ>0 in equation (52).
21Again, following the same procedure as before, the dynamic system driving
c, kI and b consists of (40) and (41), as well as
˙ b
b
=
©
(Π + Γb
−1)τg− β
ª
(υHτg)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I + c, (55)
where Γ ≡ Σh=I,H,Mυh + θ − 1.
Following the same calculations as before, it can be shown that the steady-
state growth rate is given equivalently by (27), (44), or
γ =
h
Γ˜ b
−1τ˜ g +( 1− β)
i
˜ k
α
I ˜ h
β.
5.3 A Modiﬁed Golden Rule
We ﬁnally deﬁne a modiﬁed golden rule (denoted MGR) where the govern-
ment can issue bonds to ﬁnance not only infrastructure but also maintenance
and health spending, while remaining constrained to borrow for interest pay-
ments. The government budget constraint is now represented by
GU + T + rB = θτ(ωH + rW),
with debt accumulation evolving according to
˙ B = GI + GH + GM − (1 − θ)τ(ωH + rW). (56)
Solving as before, the dynamics of consumption and infrastructure capital
with this speciﬁcation are given by (40) and (41) whereas the equation of
motion for bonds now becomes
˙ b
b
=
©
(Π + Γb
−1)τg− 1
ª
(υHτg)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I + c. (57)
A g a i n ,f o l l o w i n gt h es a m ec a l c u l a t i o np r o c e d u r ea sb e f o r e ,t h es t e a d y -
state growth rate can be shown to be given equivalently by (27), (40), or
γ = Γ˜ b
−1τ˜ g˜ k
α
I ˜ h
β.
We therefore have ﬁve dynamic systems to consider: the BBR, given by
equations (25) and (26), the GR, consisting of (40)-(42), the PS, consisting
of (40), (41) and (51), the MPSR, consisting of (40), (41) and (55) and the
MGR represented by (40), (41) and (57). We were able to establish formally
22earlier that the BBR system is saddlepath stable in the vicinity of the BGP.
For all the others, however, saddlepath stability (even in a local sense) is not
guaranteed, given their high degree of nonlinearity and the complexity of the
relevant conditions.18 To examine whether stability holds under plausible
values for the parameters, and to study how the speed of convergence to the
steady state (following a shock) depends on the speciﬁcation of the rule, we
turn to numerical simulations.
6C a l i b r a t i o n
As our starting point, we dwell to a signiﬁcant extent on the calibration exer-
cise performed in Agénor (2005c), who provides a more detailed motivation
for our choices and a comparison between alternative sources. As in that
study, parameters are chosen to roughly match some “stylized” facts about
middle-income developing countries with a small initial public debt. We will
also consider an alternative benchmark, that of a highly-indebted country.
We consider an economy with a relatively low stock of public capital
to begin with. Speciﬁcally, with output Y normalized to 1,000, the initial
public capital stock is set at 600, implying an initial public capital-output
ratio of 0.6. The private capital stock is set at 2,000, implying that the
initial private capital-output ratio is 2 and the private-public capital ratio is
about 3.3. Thus, of the two components of physical capital, public capital
is the relatively scarce factor, with potentially a large (marginal) impact on
growth.
The elasticities of production of commodities with respect to public cap-
ital and eﬀective labor, α and β respectively, are set equal to 0.1 and 0.6.
These estimates imply a share of private capital in output equal to 0.3.F o r
the health technology, an appropriate value for the coeﬃcient μ is more
diﬃcult to pin down, because the empirical evidence is essentially microeco-
nomic in nature. At the same time, as noted earlier, assessing the impact
of infrastructure on growth and stability is a key purpose of the model. Ac-
18In all systems other than BBR, c can jump whereas kI and b are predetermined.
Saddlepath stability requires therefore one unstable (positive) root. The Routh-Hurwicz
conditions require that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of each
dynamic system be positive (in order to exclude one or three negative roots), whereas its
trace must be negative (in order to guarantee at least one negative root). These conditions
are very diﬃcult to establish in an unambiguous way.
23cordingly, we chose an initial value of μ =0 .1 and perform some sensitivity
tests.
T h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,ρ,i ss e ta t4 percent, a fairly conventional
choice. Private consumption, C, which is determined from the goods market
equilibrium condition, represents about 85 percent of output. The intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is set at 0.2. This is consistent with the ev-
idence for many low- and middle-income developing countries, as discussed
by Agénor and Montiel (2006).
The tax rate on output, τ, is set at 0.2. This value is in line with actual
ratios for many developing countries, where taxation (which is essentially
indirect in nature) provides a more limited source of revenue than in indus-
trial countries. The initial shares of government spending on infrastructure
services and health services, υI and υH,a r eb o t hs e ta t0.25.T h es h a r eo f
spending on maintenance, υM,i ss e ta t0.05, whereas the share of “unproduc-
tive” spending, υU (which includes also public wages and salaries, although
they are not explicitly accounted for in our framework) is set at 0.15.T h u s ,
in the benchmark BBR case, the share of transfers, υT,i s0.3, as implied by
the budget constraint (18).
The initial stock of public debt, B is set at 400. We therefore consider
the case of a country where the debt burden burden, while signiﬁcant (at
40 percent of output), is not too high. In the results reported below, two
alternative values are chosen for the parameter characterizing the eﬃciency of
infrastructure investment. Speciﬁcally, we consider a “high eﬃciency” case,
where ϕ =0 .8,a n da“ l o w e re ﬃciency” case, where ϕ =0 .5. A new baseline
is, of course, computed for each set of parameters. The coeﬃcient ε is set
at 0.3,and ζ as 0.01 initially, to yield annual depreciation rates of around 4
percent for infrastructure capital. We also experimented with a higher value
of ζ, to investigate the case where the eﬀect of maintenance spending on
the depreciation of infrastructure capital is larger. The coeﬃcient θ is set
at 1, both for computational simplicity and to ensure that in the absence of
dynamic adjustment in the model, the government does not become a net
creditor in the steady state.
Calibration of the model around these initial values and parameters (which
involves also determining appropriate multiplicative constants in the produc-
tion functions for commodities and educated labor) produces the baseline
solution. Given the values described above, initial ratios of kI,a n db are,
respectively 0.31,a n d0.21, whereas the initial steady-state growth rate is
equal to 2.5 percent.
247N u m e r i c a l S i m u l a t i o n s
We now examine the stability and convergence properties of the models asso-
ciated with the various rules speciﬁed earlier. To do so we consider both the
base calibration and the alternative cases described in the previous section.
With consumption being a forward-looking variable, we use the “extended
path” method of Fair and Taylor (1984) as our solution procedure. This it-
erative procedure is quite convenient (once a discrete-time approximation of
the model is written) because it allows one to solve perfect foresight models
in their nonlinear form. The terminal condition imposed on consumption
is that its growth rate at the terminal horizon (t+50 periods here) must be
equal to the growth rate of the private capital stock, given the condition that
c = C/KP must be constant along the balanced growth path.
For all experiments, we report the behavior of the ratio of public debt
to output, B/Y, the economy’s growth rate, measured as the growth rate
of output, and the ratio of public debt to the stock of public capital in
infrastructure, B/KI. This last ratio can be viewed as an indicator of the
net liability position of the public sector, with a ratio lower (greater) than
unity corresponding to a case where net liabilities are negative (positive).
Under BBR, of course, the stock of debt is constant over time, and the net
liability position moves in opposite direction to changes in the stock of public
infrastructure.
7.1 Increase in Spending Shares
We ﬁrst experiment with increasing the government spending shares on in-
vestment in infrastructure, health, and maintenance. In order to contrast
the growth and debt eﬀects, we assume in this section that increases in these
shares are ﬁnanced through borrowing where the government is not restricted
by the rule to ﬁnance the additional spending by issuing bonds, and through
a fall in transfers where the rule prevents the government from doing so.
7.1.1 Infrastructure
We ﬁrst consider a 5 percentage-point increase in υI from 0.25 to 0.3. The
additional spending on infrastructure is ﬁnanced by bonds in GR, MGR and
MPSR as deﬁned by (31),(54) and (56), whereas transfers are reduced by 5
percentage points under the PSR. Consequently, the increase in spending on
25infrastructure does not yield to debt accumulation in PSR and the dynamics
of the debt-output ratio are entirely driven by the initial productivity of
infrastructure and private capital.
The results are reported in Figure 1. Given the assumption of relative
scarcity of infrastructure capital with respect to private capital in the calibra-
tion, the debt-output ratio displays a large initial fall under PSR, although
it stabilizes at a lower value (relative to the baseline solution) in the steady
state as diminishing returns set in. In GR, MGR and MPSR, the eﬀect of
the increase in infrastructure spending on debt accumulation is twofold: an
increase in the debt stock due to higher borrowing, and a subsequent increase
in interest payments as the marginal productivity of private capital, r,r i s e s
in parallel with the shock. The increase in interest payments further trans-
lates into a higher tax base in all these rules (given the deﬁnition of taxable
income), but it also raises borrowing for maintenance and health under MGR
and MPSR because all government spending is proportional to the tax base.19
However, higher borrowing also leads to crowding out of private capital and
therefore the overall eﬀect on output depends on the relative productivity of
these factors in production. Owing to high productivity of health especially,
the positive eﬀect of additional productive government spending dominates
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect associated with the crowding out of private capital; in
the long run, the debt-output ratio increases by less, and output grows by
more, under MPSR and MGR than under GR.20 The MPSR displays the
largest eﬀect on growth because the ﬁnancing of interest payments through
borrowing yields faster debt accumulation and larger increases in the tax
base than the MGR. But at the same time, the debt-output ratio is more
sensitive to movements in interest rates under MPSR. Swings in the debt-
output ratio are therefore sharper under MPSR, and the long-run increase in
that ratio is larger than under MGR. The BBR and the PSR (under which
t h ei n c r e a s ei nυI is ﬁnanced by a reduction in transfers) display the lowest
19Unlike Greiner and Semmler (2000), who assume that infrastructure investment is
determined residually from available tax revenues, in our framework we assume that it is
transfers (or equivalently lump-sum taxes) that adjust in response to changes in interest
payments under GR as well as MGR. Therefore, the “internal crowding-out eﬀect” as-
sociated with an increase in interest payments on productive spending, as identiﬁed by
Greiner and Semmler (2000), is not present in our case.
20The ordering of the rules is invariant to the length of the simulation period, and MPS
always stabilizes at a lower value than GR in the base calibration. However, simulations
with diﬀerent conﬁgurations of spending shares show that MPS may not yield convergence
due to excessive debt accumulation.
26eﬀects on output growth. In the PSR rule especially, although the return
on bonds increases, the overall fall in the debt-output ratio translates into a
lower share of interest income in the tax base to ﬁnance investment in health
and maintenance, and therefore deviations of output growth from baseline
a r ee v e ns m a l l e rt h a nu n d e rB B R .
Regarding the net liability position of the government, the MPSR and
MGR rules deliver the largest drops from baseline despite the fact that addi-
tional spending is ﬁnanced through borrowing in these regimes–as opposed
to the PSR rule where it is carried out through a reduction in transfers. In
essence, these rules perform better than the Golden Rule (despite the fact
that they lead to more borrowing initially) because there is higher public
capital accumulation and faster growth.
7.1.2 Maintenance
The dynamics associated with a 5 percentage-point increase in υM are dis-
played in Figure 2. Unlike the shock to υI in the previous section, the debt-
ouput ratios increase steadily under the MPSR and the MGR. Although the
increase in maintenance spending stimulates higher investment in infrastruc-
ture and health under these rules (as in the previous case), the relatively low
productivity of maintenance itself yields an initial increase in the debt-output
ratio that stabilizes over time. For the same reason, maintenance cannot
compensate for the drop in transfers under PSR, and the debt-output ratio
displays only a small reduction–before stabilizing at a value slightly above
baseline. At the same time, under GR, where interest payments do not aﬀect
debt accumulation, the debt-output ratio falls slightly at ﬁrst and converges
to the baseline value in the long run.
Regarding the growth rate of output, the only diﬀerence with the previous
experiment is that PSR now performs better than BBR and MGR because
faster debt accumulation, as indicated by the positive deviation from base-
line of the debt-output ratio, generates more productive government spend-
ing. Finally, the net liability position of the government behaves just like
the debt-output ratio in this case, because maintenance has indirect eﬀects
on the stock of infrastructure capital and growth. Given our initial calibra-
tion, the positive aﬀect of additional maintenance spending on the rate of
depreciation of public infrastructure does not compensate for the additional
borrowing required to ﬁnance this spending, and the net liability position of
the government worsens under the MGR and MPSR.
277.1.3 Health
Next, we consider a 5 percentage-point increase in υH, ﬁnanced through
borrowing under MGR and MPSR, and through a reduction in transfers un-
der GR and PSR. The results for the main variables of interest are reported
in Figure 3. As shown in the upper panel, the debt-output ratio exhibits
an initial drop under each rule, because unlike infrastructure investment and
maintenance expenditures that are predetermined, health spending enters
the production function for health services (and thus productivity) contem-
poraneously. The increase in υH leads therefore to an instantaneous jump
in output. The fall in the debt-output ratio further accelerates in the fol-
l o w i n gp e r i o d sb u ts l o w sd o w n( a sb e f o r e )o n c ed i m i n i s h i n gr e t u r n ss e ti n .
However, because of the relatively high productivity of health, MPSR per-
forms better than MGR in terms of the debt-output ratio in the present case,
while displaying the largest drop throughout the adjustment period. In ad-
dition, unlike what happens with an increase in maintenance spending, the
debt-output ratio falls more under MGR and MPSR than under GR–even
if additional spending in the former regimes is ﬁnanced by borrowing. Al-
though the BBR, GR and MGR rules give higher increases in the growth rate
of output than MPSR initially, the MPSR again performs best in the longer
run. Clearly, the indirect increases in spending on infrastructure and main-
tenance allowed by a higher tax base and government revenues are initially
unable to compensate for the adverse crowding-out eﬀect of private capital
through interest payments in this case. This eﬀe c ti se v e nm o r es i g n i ﬁcant
because the jump in the rate of return on capital is also magniﬁed by the
productivity eﬀect of health spending. Consequently, non-primary surplus
rules give better results in in the initial phase of the adjustment process.
At the same time, the simulation results reveal that the dynamics of the
debt-output ratio and the net liability position of the government are quite
distinct from each other in the case at hand. Although health spending is
highly productive and the debt-output ratio drops signiﬁcantly, the eﬀect of
health spending on infrastructure capital operates through the increase in
output (which enlarges the tax base) and subsequently higher investment on
infrastructure. Thus, the MPSR exhibits a cyclical pattern with a worsening
of the net liability position of the government in the long run, whereas under
the MGR the transition is smoother and the long-run deviation from baseline
is less pronounced. Under the PSR, the behavior of the net liability position
mainly depends on the relative productivity of private capital and health–
28as well as the upward movement in the interest rate due to the increase
in the productivity of private capital–because infrastructure investment is
proportional to the tax base, whereas under GR, the expansion of the tax base
also triggers borrowing for infrastructure investment. This, in turn, limits
the improvement in the net liability position of the government, relative to
the PSR rule.
7.2 Reallocation of Unproductive Spending
We now consider the case where the government cuts the share of unproduc-
tive spending by 5 percentage points, that is, a reduction in υU from 0.15
to 0.1, and reallocates the additional resources to infrastructure investment,
maintenance expenditure, and health spending. The results are shown in
Figures 4 to 6.
Consider ﬁrst the case where the resources created by the cut in unpro-
ductive spending are used to ﬁnance additional infrastructure investment.
As shown in Figure 4, under every rule, the debt-output ratio behaves in a
manner similar to the pattern observed in the previous experiment (increase
in the share of spending on health). At ﬁrst, the ratio drops quite signiﬁ-
cantly; but as the growth rate of output stabilizes, the magnitude of the drop
falls markedly. However, the deviations are also strictly negative, because re-
sources are now reallocated from unproductive to productive spending. With
respect to the growth rate of output, the BBR, GR and MGR rules again
deliver higher growth than the primary surplus rules initially, but the MPSR
dominates in the longer run. The main reason for this is that the magnitude
of the increase in the growth rate largely depends on the initial marginal
product of infrastructure, which is highest in BBR due to lack of debt accu-
mulation induced by higher public investment. However, as the fall in the
interest rate stabilizes and interest payments begin to represent a larger part
of the tax base, the government invests more in health and maintenance un-
der the MPSR, and the increase in the growth rate of output in the long run
tends to exceed the increase observed under the other rules.
Next, consider the case where the cut in unproductive spending is reallo-
cated to maintenance expenditure. As illustrated in Figure 5, the dynamics
of debt accumulation are aﬀected in exactly the same way as above. How-
ever, this time around, the BBR, GR and the MGR perform better than
the primary surplus rules with respect to growth throughout the adjustment
period. The growth rate stabilizes at higher values than before, with a much
29lower dispersion across rules. Regarding the net liability position of the gov-
ernment, the allocation of resources toward infrastructure or maintenance
leads to an improvement under all rules–and particularly so under MPSR.
In both Figure 4 and Figure 5, the path of debt-public capital ratios follows
closely the behavior of debt-output ratios.
Finally, Figure 6 illustrates the case where the resources generated by a
cut in unproductive spending are used to increase spending on health. As in
F i g u r e3 ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nh e a l t hs p e n d i n gy i e l d sac o n t e m p o r a n e o u si n c r e a s e
in labor productivity and output (and thus tax revenues), a drop in the debt-
output ratio, and a jump in the growth rate. Debt dynamics in subsequent
periods are, again, as described above, but volatility is larger due to the rel-
atively high productivity of health. Except under MPSR, the increase in the
growth rate converges smoothly under all rules. BBR and MGR deliver again
the highest growth eﬀects in the early phase of adjustment. Nevertheless, as
in the case of a reallocation to infrastructure, the MPSR rule displays an
increasing trend as the fall in the interest rate slows down, and the growth
rate of output in the long run rises slightly more than the other rules.
At the same time, a shift from unproductive spending to health delivers
mixed results with respect to the net liability position of the government
because–unlike the shifts toward infrastructure and maintenance–output
and the interest rate increase contemporenously as a result of the shock.
Thus, the initial increase in the interest rate, and the additional borrowing
for maintenance and health generated by the increase in the tax base, cause
the net liability position to worsen under all rules initially. This is even
more so under MPSR, because both interest payments and each category
of (productive) government spending add to the debt stock. However, as
the interest rate falls and infrastructure investment increases (as a result of
higher output and tax revenues), the net liability position of the government
improves in the longer run. Again, as before, the PSR and MPSR rules are
more volatile than the GR and MGR rules, because of movements in interest
payments.
8S e n s i t i v i t y A n a l y s i s
To examine how robust the above results are, we perform sensitivity analysis
involving a lower value of the degree of eﬃciency of public investment outlays
in infrastructure, a higher initial level of public debt, an endogenous risk
30premium (related to the debt-public capital ratio), and a higher degree of
sensitivity of the depreciation rate of public capital to government spending
on maintenance.
8.1 Low Eﬃciency of Infrastructure Investment
In order to assess the role of the degree of eﬃciency of public infrastructure
investment, we considered the case where ϕ =0 .5 instead of 0.8.F i g u r e s
7 to 12 display the dynamics associated with an increase in υI,a ni n c r e a s e
in υM,a ni n c r e a s ei nυH,as h i f tf r o mυU to υI, υM,a n dυH respectively,
as in the previous section. Clearly, the impact of a lower ϕ is to reduce
the productivity of all spending components due to gross complementarity.
The debt-output ratio and the growth rate of output are therefore adversely
aﬀected. Whereas Figures 7 and 8 show that increases in the debt-output
ratio in the long run are higher than the high-eﬃciency case following an
increase in υI and υM, Figures 9-12 show that the drops in that ratio are
lower after an increase in υH or a shift from unproductive to any category
of productive spending. Moreover, a lower eﬃciency of public infrastructure
investment favours PSR against the golden rules because the PSR rule does
not allow the government to borrow for (relatively ineﬃcient) infrastructure
investment. The PSR rule now performs better than GR in terms of the debt-
output ratio and yields higher drops in that ratio when there is an increase
in health spending (Figure 9), or when there is a shift from υU to υI, υM,o r
υH ( s e eF i g u r e s1 0t o1 2 ) .
For the same reason, the net liability position of the govenment displays
similar dynamics, and in the case of an increase in υH PSR yields the highest
improvement (see Figure 9), whereas in the other ﬁgures the wedge between
PSR and the other rules is the largest (lowest) where PSR initially performs
better (worse). Similarly, falls in the long-run debt-output ratio are now very
close to each other under MGR and PSR in case of a shift from υU to υM
(see Figure 11), in contrast to the high eﬃciency case (see Figure 4).
A tt h es a m et i m e ,l o w e re ﬃciency of public infrastructure investment
reduces the growth performance of MPSR against the other rules. Whereas
the wedges between MPSR and the other rules are smaller now, following an
increase in υI and υM, it takes the MPSR rule longer to “catch up” with the
BBR and the golden rules following an increase in υH (see Figures 7 to 9).
This is also the case when there is a shift from unproductive spending toward
infrastructure (see Figure 10) or toward health (see Figure 12), whereas in
31the case of a shift to maintenance spending, MPSR yields the lowest increase
i nt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fo u t p u ti nt h el o n gr u n( s e eF i g u r e1 1 ) .
8.2 High Initial Level of Public Debt
We also experimented with a high initial debt-output ratio, with an value
of B0 =7 0 0instead of 400. The results were very similar to those obtained
earlier, and therefore we omit illustrative graphs to save space.21 The main
diﬀerence is the magnitude of the shifts in the debt-output ratio and the
growth rate during the adjustment period.
Moreover, we found that the model displayed explosive behavior for the
MPSR when B0 = 800. Thus, as can be expected, if the initial value of debt
is too high, the model displays unstable dynamics. Without an endogenous
adjustment in the tax rate or a spending component, the rise in interest rate
payments is such that it throws the model oﬀ its saddlepath.
8.3 Endogenous Risk Premium
It may be argued that the main reason primary surplus rules perform well
(especially in terms of debt dynamics) in the foregoing experiments is that
the interest rate on bonds is not linked to the outstanding level of debt–
an assumption that may be viewed as questionable for most countries. In
practice, the interest rate on bonds often includes a premium that increases
with net liabilities due the higher (perceived) default risk. To account for
this eﬀect, we deﬁn e da ne n d o g e n o u sr i s kp r e m i u m ,PR,a s
PR=
κ
2
(
B
KI
)
2, (58)
where κ>0. Convexity implies that the faster the speed at which the net
liability position deteriorates, the larger the increase in the risk premium
demanded by markets for holding government debt.22
Using (58), the return on bonds, rB, can be written as
rB = r + PR.
21A complete set of ﬁg u r e si sa v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
22Note that the premium could also be deﬁned as a function not of net liabilities or
assets (that is, stocks) but rather as a function of liquidity (ﬂows), measured for instance
by the ratio of interest payments at the “risk-free” rate, r, to tax revenues. However, the
speciﬁcation used in (58) is suﬃcient for the purpose at hand.
32We chose MPSR as the most appropriate rule to perform this sensitivity
exercise, given that it is the rule that is most responsive to changes in the
interest rate. In the benchmark case considered earlier, B/KI =4 0 0 /600 =
67 percent, and the government’s net liability position is negative. We set
κ =0 .0001 and κ =0 .0005, and simulate the model for a 5 percentage-point
increases in υI and υM. Figures 13 and 14 present the results. While a higher
premium leads to a fall in deviations of the debt-output ratio from baseline
and a lower growth rate when spending on infrastructure increases because
the net liability position of the government improves, the reverse holds when
υM is increased instead. Essentially, the eﬀect of an increase in υI on the
stock of infrastructure capital is higher than the eﬀect on the debt stock. The
government therefore beneﬁts from a fall in the risk premium more as the
sensitivity of the premium to the net liability position of the public sector
increases.
However, the same result does not hold when maintenance expenditures
increase, because the eﬀect of maintenance spending on infrastructure capital
(given our initial calibration) is not strong enough to oﬀset the increase in the
debt stock; as a result, following the shock, the net liability position of the
government deteriorates. In this case, the government suﬀers from increasing
interest payments as the premium rises. Additional productive government
spending via a higher tax base brings higher growth than the baseline whereas
the reverse is true for an increase in infrastructure investment. It must also
be noted that for κ ≥ 0.001, the rule displays explosive dynamics as excessive
debt accumulation completely crowds out private investment.23
8.4 Maintenance and Depreciation of Public Capital
Next, we experimented with an alternative value of the coeﬃcient that de-
termines the eﬀect of maintenance spending on the depreciation rate of in-
frastructure, ζ. We take GR, MGR and MPSR as above and simulate the
model for ζ =0 .02, instead of the baseline value of 0.01.T h e b e h a v i o r o f
the growth rate of output in response to a 5 percentage-point increase in υM
is presented in Figure 15 for each of these three rules. Unsurprisingly, the
additional spending on maintenance contributes more to growth as ζ goes
23We also experimented, with an alternative speciﬁcation of the premium, with B/KP
in (58); this relationship could be derived from a simple portfolio equation for the private
sector. In that case, we were able to increase κ all the way up to 0.013.B e y o n d t h a t
value, however, the model also diverged.
33up, and the shifts in transitional and long-run growth rates are very close to
each other for the three regimes. The ﬁgures also suggest that although the
magnitude of the wedge between the rules may be slightly aﬀected in case of
a higher productivity of maintenance spending, the ordering of the rules in
Figures 3 and 9 is not altered.
8.5 Higher Health-Infrastructure Elasticity
Finally, we performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to the elasticity of
health output to infrastructure capital, μ, under the GR, MGR, and MPSR
r u l e sa n da p p l y i n ga5p e r c e n t a g e - p o i n ti n c r e a s et oυI. The results are dis-
p l a y e di nF i g u r e s1 6t o1 8f o rμ =0 .1, which corresponds to the baseline
case, and μ =0 .2. Clearly, the impact of a higher elasticity of health to
infrastructure is to magnify the fall in the debt-output ratio, as well as the
improvement in the net liability position of the government, under each rule.
These eﬀects are larger under MPSR, as could be expected. At the same
time, the growth rate of output increases more signiﬁcantly under GR be-
cause with μ =0 .2 the government borrows to ﬁnance health expenditures
that are less productive now (see equation (5)) under MGR and MPSR.
Thus, the crowding-out eﬀect of public debt accumulation on private capital
formation is stronger, whereas the positive eﬀect of productive government
spending on output is weaker, than in the case where μ =0 .1.
9C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper was to examine the performance of alternative
ﬁscal rules in an endogenous growth model with public capital and debt. The
ﬁrst part of the paper provided a brief review of the current debate on the
golden rule, whereas the second part presented the analytical framework. In
the model, in addition to investing in infrastructure, the government spends
on maintenance (which improves the durability of public capital) and health
(which raises labor productivity). Infrastructure aﬀects the production of
both commodities and health services.
The third part discussed the properties of the model under a balanced
budget rule. Because the model is analytically tractable under that rule,
we fully characterized its stability and uniqueness properties. We then con-
sidered several alternative rules–a “standard” golden rule, a “standard”
34primary rule, and modiﬁed versions of both rules to exclude all productive
spending (infrastructure investment, but also current outlays on maintenance
and health). Because the resulting models are too complex to solve analyti-
cally (as a result of the higher dimension added by public debt accumulation),
we resorted to numerical techniques for dynamic comparative analysis.
After discussing the calibration procedure, the performance of all rules
was examined in response to two types of shocks–an increase in the shares
of spending on infrastructure, maintenance, and health; and a reallocation of
unproductive spending to alternative types of productive expenditure. Under
a range of plausible parameter conﬁgurations (pertaining, in particular, to
t h ed e g r e eo fe ﬃciency of public investment) and spending shares, and as
long as the risk premium on government bonds is not too elastic to the
debt-public capital ratio, our numerical simulations showed that in response
to these shocks a primary surplus rule that excludes productive spending
performs better than alternative rules–in the sense of yielding higher steady-
state growth, stable debt-output ratios, and more rapid convergence. Thus,
“narrow” rules, which do not account for the fact that some components
of current spending may have a high pay-oﬀ in terms of growth without
jeopardizing ﬁscal performance, can be described as tyrannical in nature.
The analysis presented in this paper could be extended in various direc-
tions. For instance, it could be worth examining the welfare eﬀects of ﬁscal
rules, in addition to their implications for growth and ﬁscal sustainability,
as we have done here. Studies by Stockman (2001) and others, have shown
indeed that welfare losses associated with (narrow) ﬁscal rules can be sub-
stantial. In that context, accounting for the eﬀect of health services on utility
in a non-separable manner (as, for instance, in Agénor (2005d)), or for a di-
rect eﬀect of health on the rate of time preference (as in Agénor (2006)) would
be critical for ranking alternative rules–especially if the “modiﬁed” primary
surplus rules are examined in more detail, by considering separately rules ex-
cluding and including expenditure on health only. Another useful extension
would be to account, as in Agénor (2005b), for endogenous depreciation of
private capital, in response to government spending on maintenance. As doc-
umented by Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006), such eﬀects can be sizable,
particularly in the area of transport.
However, although these extensions would be valuable in their own right,
they are unlikely to alter some of the broad policy lessons that can be drawn
from the present analysis. First, there are parameter conﬁgurations for which
the primary surplus rules lead to unsustainable ratios of public debt (in the
35sense that the model does not converge, following a speciﬁcs h o c k ) . I n -
tuitively, if components of spending are productive but not very much so,
excluding them from the primary surplus rule is bound to create instability.
Although we focused our discussion on cases where the steady-state path
is stable (in order to perform meaningful comparisons across rules), this is
important to keep in mind. Similarly, ﬁnancing all productive components
of public spending through borrowing can be destabilizing if the initial level
of debt is high to begin with and/or the risk premium is highly sensitive to
the debt-public capital ratio, that is, the government’s net liability position.
Second, to the extent that there is heterogeneity among parameters and
starting values, imposing uniform ﬁscal rules “across the board” to a group
of countries because they share a common monetary arrangement (as is
presently the case in the Euro area or the Western African Economic and
Monetary Union, for instance) makes little sense. In countries where stocks of
public infrastructure assets are relatively low to begin with, greater latitude
to ﬁnance investment outlays through borrowing makes sense economically–
a sl o n ga st h ei n v e s t m e n ti ss u ﬃciently eﬃcient (in the sense that it does in-
deed turn into capital) and productive. This may actually improve prospects
for ﬁscal stability. By implication, imposing uniform debt-output ratios
(or, more appropriately, debt-asset ratios) would also be sub-optimal in
the sense that it would unduly constrain growth and actually hamper ﬁscal
sustainability–unless, again, these ratios are high to begin with and have a
large eﬀect on the risk premium embedded in interest rates.
Third, our focus on growth (and transitional dynamics) should not lead
us to lose sight of the fact that ﬁscal rules are also imposed in order to avoid
procyclical government spending from exacerbating macroeconomic volatil-
i t y . T ot h ee x t e n tt h a ts u c hv o l a t i l i t yi sd e t r i m e n t a lt og r o w t h( a ss h o w n
in a number of recent studies), a potential trade-oﬀ may emerge. For in-
stance, if a “standard” ﬁscal rule succeeds in lowering volatility signiﬁcantly,
constraining productive spending may be ultimately beneﬁcial to growth.24
The nature of this trade-oﬀ would normally depend on a number of insti-
tutional factors, in addition the structural characteristics of the economy.
In countries where political polarization is high, or the national legislature
is fragmented across a large number of political parties, the propensity to
engage in procyclical spending may be quite strong and tight rules may be
24Moreover, volatility may have large welfare costs, as documented by Pallage and Robe
(2003), independently of its impact on growth.
36inevitable.
Fourth, the modiﬁed primary surplus rule in our analysis does not pro-
vide a clear guide as to where one should “draw the line” on current outlays.
Indeed, we assumed the population to be constant in the model. But sup-
pose that population is endogenous and that “raw” labor must be educated
to become productive (as in Agénor (2005a,2 0 0 5 c)). Suppose also that the
education technology is such that it depends on government spending as
well. The foregoing analysis suggests therefore that spending on education
should also be excluded from the rule, as long as it is suﬃciently produc-
tive. The reasoning can of course be pushed one step further; it could be
argued that wages and salaries of public servants (a large share of public
spending in most countries) are “productive” to some degree because they
increase incentives to provide eﬀort and facilitate private activity. Likewise,
spending on defense and security, or the environment, could be viewed as
being productive–feeling safer or breathing air of better quality may lead to
higher productivity. Moreover, governments may have strong incentives to
present various categories of spending as productive, even if the case for doing
so is weak.25 The implication therefore is that “drawing the line” becomes
very diﬃcult, making the practical implementation of the modiﬁed primary
surplus rule problematic at best–given the objective of ﬁscal stability.
Our proposal is that, rather than focus solely on formal ﬁscal rules per
se, governments should be required to announce and justify a multi-year,
Core Productive Expenditure Program (CPEP) that is fully transparent.
This would be a particularly important step for developing countries, where
enhancing the growth eﬀects of ﬁscal policy represent an acute policy is-
sue. The CPEP should include only the “most productive” components of
both current and public capital expenditures, as voted into law or adopted
by Parliament. Moreover, it should be realistic, in the sense that it should
be based on reasonable ﬁnancing assumptions. In line with the foregoing
analysis, therefore, the conventional distinction between current and capi-
tal spending would give way to a more economically meaningful distinction,
at least from a growth perspective, between (highly) productive and (rel-
25In fact, the experience so far with ﬁscal policy rules has been mixed; although there
have been some successful cases, a number of rules have been ineﬀective, suspended, or
abandoned (see Kopits, 2001). In some cases, nontransparent, oﬀ-budget practices, or
“creative accounting” have proliferated; see Bohn (2006) for the experience of some Euro-
pean countries under the Maastricht Criteria.
37atively) unproductive outlays.26 The explicit nature of the CPEP would
force the government to explain its spending program, its ﬁnancing (through
both earmarked revenues and borrowing), and its implications for growth.
A multi-year framework would also make expenditure management and re-
source allocation more responsive to national priorities, by providing a more
predictable environment for program planning and implementation.
The CPEP would therefore be protected from the vagaries of ﬁscal sta-
bilization. Indeed, budgets are often characterized by expenditure rigidities;
a large fraction of outlays (pensions, social security, debt service, wages,
transfers to sub-national governments) are not discretionary. Greater ﬁscal
transparency would help the public to monitor what the government does,
whether it is in the context of an explicit strategy for growth (as in low-
income countries, for instance) or not. Moreover, imposing transparency
would limit incentives to include components of spending for well-known po-
litical reasons (see Khemani (2006)), thereby alleviating the moral hazard
and “create accounting” problems that are often raised in reference to the
golden rule.
Here, it is worth making a parallel with the current state of information
disclosure on monetary policy. Only 15 years ago, very few would have
predicted that central banks (in developing and developed countries alike)
would be as transparent as they are today in their operations. Our view
is that such transparency with regard to a core program would only beneﬁt
ﬁscal policy.27 Of course, for government-provided information to be credible
may entail setting up an independent and non-partisan agency, such as a
Fiscal Policy Committee (FPC) as proposed by Eichengreen, Hausman and
von Hagen (1999) and Wyplosz (2002). In our proposal, in addition to having
legal authority to impose explicit constraints on the overall size of public
deﬁcits and debt, the FPC would monitor progress (or lack thereof) toward
achieving the CPEP and communicate this information to the public through
regular publications. However, other institutional arrangements could be put
in place. In some countries, for instance, this function could be delegated
to a joint committee representing all the parties involved in the preparation
26To avoid the negative connotation associated with the term “unproductive,” more
neutral language could of course be used.
27Note that we are advocating greater transparency with respect only to a CPEP, not
regarding all ﬁscal accounts (which would involve, for instance, explicit and accurate re-
porting of all contingent liabilities). Although the latter would be of course desirable, it
has proved very diﬃcult to achieve–for obvious political economy reasons.
38of a strategy paper for poverty reduction, because of the inclusive nature
of the process. In either case, however, an open question–which goes well
beyond the scope of the present study–is how best to determinate the nature
and extent of sanctions that should be imposed for non-compliance with the
CPEP, that is, how to make governments accountable for poor performance.
39Appendix
Stability with a Balanced Budget Rule
With a balanced budget, the dynamic system consists of equations (25)
and (26), which are repeated here for convenience:
˙ c
c
=( σs− q)(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I + c − σρ, (A1)
˙ kI
kI
= τ
1/ΩχυH
(1−μ)β/Ωk
−η/Ω
I − q(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ωk
(α+μβ)/Ω
I + c − 1. (A2)
To investigate the dynamics in the vicinity of the steady state, this system
can be linearized to give
∙
˙ c
˙ kI
¸
=
∙
a11 a12
a21 a22
¸∙
c − ˜ c
kI − ˜ kI
¸
, (A3)
with the aij given by
a11 =˜ c, a12 =( σs− q)(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ω(α + μβ)/Ω˜ k
−η/Ω
I ˜ c, a21 = ˜ kI,
a22 =( −η/Ω)τ
1/ΩχυH
(1−μ)β/Ω˜ k
−η/Ω
I −q(α+μβ)/Ω(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ω˜ k
(α+μβ)/Ω
I < 0,
where ˜ x denotes the stationary value of x. In principle, a12 can be either
positive or negative; we assume in what follows that σ is suﬃciently small to
ensure that a12 < 0.28
The consumption-private capital ratio, c,i saj u m pv a r i a b l e ,w h e r e a s
the public-private capital ratio, kI, is predetermined. Saddlepath stability
requires one unstable (positive) root. To ensure that this condition holds,
the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of the dynamic
system (A3) must be negative, that is, a11a22 − a12a21 < 0,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,
−a12/a11 < −a22/a21.I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that–regardless of the sign of a12–
this condition always holds in the present case.29 Therefore, the system
is saddlepath stable. The slope of the saddlepath SS,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y
κ = −a12/(˜ c − ν),w h e r eν is the negative root of the system, is positive,
given that a12 < 0.
28See Agénor (2005a) for a discussion of the general case.
29To see this, note that from equations (21), (22), and (23) in the text, and us-
ing (α + μβ)/Ω =( 1 − η/Ω),w ec a nw r i t ea12a21 =
£
σρ˜ c − ˜ c2¤
(1 − η/Ω), and a22 =
[(−η/Ω)(1 − ˜ c) − (γ +˜ c].
40From (A1), setting ˙ c =0yields
˜ c = σρ+( q − σs)(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ω˜ k
(α+μβ)/Ω
I . (A4)
Substituting (A4) in (A2) with ˙ kI =0yields the implicit function
F(˜ kI) ≡ τ
1/ΩχυH
(1−μ)β/Ω˜ k
−η/Ω
I − σs(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ω˜ k
(α+μβ)/Ω
I + σρ− 1=0 .
(A5)
To show that the BGP is unique, note ﬁrst that from (A5),
F˜ kI =( −η/Ω)τ
1/ΩχυH
(1−μ)β/Ω1
I ˜ k
−η/Ω−1
I − (α + μβ)/Ωσs(υHτ)
(1−μ)β/Ω˜ k
−η/Ω
I ,
which is negative along a BGP with ˜ kI > 0.T h u s ,F(˜ kI) cannot cross the
horizontal axis from below. Now, note that
lim
˜ kI→0
F(˜ kI)=+ ∞ and lim
˜ kI→+∞
F(˜ kI)=−∞.
Given that F(˜ kI) is a continuous, monotonically decreasing function of
˜ kI, there is a unique positive value of ˜ kI that satisﬁes F(˜ kI)=0 .F r o m( A 4 ) ,
there is also a unique positive value of ˜ c.
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